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State v. Taylor: Resurrecting the Absolute
Immunity of the Sovereign
At ancient common law one who made permanent improvements to real
property did so at his own risk.1 An innocent person who held land under color
of title, with a bona fide belief that he owned the land, could be sued in ejectment
by a person with superior title and had no recourse in law for the value of his
improvements. The rule's rigidity worked hardships, and the common law, fol-
lowing the law of equity, 2 developed a claim for improvements to land.3 The
claim arose as a defense to an assertion of superior title and was enforced by way
of a set-off against the true owner for the increase in value attributable to the
permanent improvements. 4
The North Carolina General Assembly adopted the common-law claim for
improvements as a statutory right in 1871. 5 In its modem form the "better-
ments" statute is intended to protect the interest of the good faith improver of
land. 6 North Carolina courts have experienced little difficulty applying and con-
struing the betterments statute. Cases turning on the statute typically have ad-
dressed two distinct issues: the defensive nature of the betterments claim 7 and
the distinction between common-law/statutory improvements claims and the eq-
uitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. 8 Beginning in 19859 the North Carolina
courts confronted a problem of a different nature when the statutory betterments
1. This principle of common law was discussed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Board of Comm'rs v. Bumpass, 237 N.C. 143, 145, 74 S.E.2d 436, 438 (1953). In contrast to the
common-law position, the civil-law rule was more liberal and permitted one who made "permanent
improvements on land in his possession under the bona fide belief that he was the owner of it to
extract from the true owner compensation for the improvements." Id.
2. Id. The chancellors of the court of equity had extended the civil-law rule to provide that
the true owner was not permitted to take possession until he paid the improver the value of the
permanent improvements on the principle that "no man should be unjustly enriched at the expense
of another who has acted in good faith." Id. at 146, 74 S.E.2d at 438.
3. Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266 N.C. 467, 471, 146 S.E.2d 434, 437 (1966); Rhyne v.
Sheppard, 224 N.C. 734, 736, 32 S.E.2d 316, 317 (1944).
4. Rhyne, 224 N.C. at 736, 32 S.E.2d at 317.
5. Public Laws of North Carolina, 1871-72, ch. 147.
6. The 1871 statute, as amended, is currently codified in the North Carolina General Statutes.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-340 (1983). In relevant part, this statute states:
A defendant against whom a judgment is rendered for land may, at any time before execu-
tion, present a petition to the court ... stating that he,... while holding the premises
under color of title believed to be good, [has] made permanent improvements thereon, and
praying that he may be allowed for the improvements ....
Id. "Color of title is a paper writing which purports to convey land but fails to do so." Carrow v.
Davis, 248 N.C. 740, 741, 105 S.E.2d 60, 61 (1958).
7. See, eg., Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266 N.C. 467, 146 S.E.2d 434 (1966); Board of
Comm'rs v. Bumpass, 237 N.C. 143, 74 S.E.2d 436 (1953); Rhyne v. Sheppard, 224 N.C. 734, 32
S.E.2d 316 (1944); Clontz v. Clontz, 44 N.C. App. 573, 261 S.E.2d 695, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C.
195, 269 S.E.2d 622 (1980).
8. See, eg., Beacon Homes, 266 N.C. at 471-72, 146 S.E.2d at 437-38; Rhyne, 224 N.C. at 736-
37, 32 S.E.2d at 317-18; Clontz, 44 N.C. App. at 575-76, 261 S.E.2d at 697.
9. On January 14, 1985, J.T. Taylor, Jr., filed a petition for betterments under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-340 seeking $300,000 for improvements he allegedly had made to the state's land. State v.
Taylor, 322 N.C. 433, 434, 368 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1988). See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text
for a complete statement of the facts.
right plowed headlong into the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity. 10
In State v. Taylor 11 the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the ques-
tion whether a claim for betterments may be maintained against the State of
North Carolina. In a decision emphasizing the absolute nature of the state's
inherent immunity from suit and relying on a strict constructionist view of any
statutory waiver of the immunity, the Taylor court held that "[t]here is no
waiver of the State's sovereign immunity in . . . [section] 1-340,"12 and thus
individuals are barred from asserting betterments claims against the state.
13
This Note examines the present scope of the claim for betterments to land
in North Carolina in the wake of Taylor. The Note traces the history of the
common-law claim for improvements and the modem statutory petition for bet-
terments under the North Carolina General Statutes. It then examines the com-
mon-law doctrine of sovereign immunity and the way in which North Carolina
courts have applied that doctrine. Analyzing the court's reasoning in holding
that the state is exempt from section 1-340 claims, the Note concludes that,
while the Taylor decision has a firm basis in North Carolina case law and is
consistent with established rules of statutory construction, the court could have
interpreted the claim for betterments as a "claim of title" as that term is used in
North Carolina General Statutes section 41-10.1.1 4 This construction would
have resulted in a more equitable disposition in Taylor and would have avoided
establishing unnecessarily rigid precedent.
In January 1971 J.T. Taylor, Jr., obtained a deed for a tract of timberland
in Craven County, North Carolina from the Brandenburg Land Company.'
5
After Taylor received and duly recorded his deed, he began work to improve the
land.1 6 He acquired a right of way, built an access road to the tract, and then
began clearing a large portion of the land and selling its timber. 17 He also con-
structed roads and a canal on the property, converted 157 acres of timberland to
farmland, and planted 12.5 acres of pine seedlings.
18
On May 1, 1978, the State of North Carolina filed suit against Taylor, alleg-
10. "Sovereign immunity is a legal principle which states in its broadest terms that the sover-
eign will not be subject to any form of judicial action without its express consent." Note, Abrogation
of Contractual Sovereign Immunity. A Judicial or Legislative Decision?, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1082, 1083 (1976). A sovereign state may waive its immunity from suit. See infra notes 69-93 and
accompanying text for a discussion of how North Carolina courts have construed waivers of sover-
eign immunity.
11. 322 N.C. 433, 368 S.E.2d 601 (1988).
12. Id. at 437, 368 S.E.2d at 603. See supra note 6 for the relevant text of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
340.
13. Taylor, 322 N.C. at 437, 368 S.E.2d at 604.
14. See infra note 28 for the relevant text of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-10.1. For example, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals in its Taylor decision reasoned that "[s]ince a claim for better-
ments can arise only by virtue of a 'claim of title' ... a claim for betterments is a 'claim of title' as
that term is used in [N.C. GEN. STAT. § ] 41-10.1." State v. Taylor, 85 N.C. App. 549, 552, 355
S.E.2d 169, 172 (1987) (emphasis added), rev'd, 322 N.C. 433, 368 S.E.2d 601 (1988).




19891 PROPER TY LAW 1435
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ing that it owned the land and that therefore Taylor was trespassing.19 The
State sought his ejectment and damages for his possession. The trial court sev-
ered the issues of title and damages and on November 20, 1981, entered judg-
ment for the State on the issue of title, permanently enjoining Taylor from going
onto the land.20 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, and the supreme
court denied Taylor's petitions for discretionary review and reconsideration. 21
On January 14, 1985, Taylor filed a petition for betterments under North
Carolina General Statutes section 1-340, seeking $300,000 for the improvements
he had made to the State's land. In response, the State set forth its sovereign
immunity as a complete defense.22 On July 1, 1985, the trial court dismissed the
State's defense of sovereign immunity23 and on April 16, 1988, it dismissed Tay-
lor's betterments claim. 24 On Taylor's appeal and the State's cross-assignment
of error, the North Carolina Court of Appeals resolved all issues in favor of Mr.
Taylor, with one judge dissenting on the issue of sovereign immunity. 25
The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case on the issue of the
state's sovereign immunity and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. 26
The supreme court maintained that "[tihe State of North Carolina is immune
from suit unless and until it expressly consents to be sued. Absent consent or
waiver, this immunity is absolute and unqualified."'27
Having affirmed the presumptive immunity of the state from suit, the
supreme court turned to the question whether the State of North Carolina had
consented to, or had waived its immunity from, claims for betterments to land.
The pivotal issue in the court's determination was the construction of section 41-
10.1, in which the general assembly expressly waived the state's immunity in




21. State v. Taylor, 63 N.C. App. 364, 304 S.E.2d 767 (1983), disc rep. denied, 310 N.C. 311,
312 S.E.2d 655, reconsideration denied, 313 S.E.2d 160 (1984). The damages issue, severed at the
original trial, is still pending. See Taylor, 322 N.C. at 434, 368 S.E.2d at 602.
22. In addition to the sovereign immunity defense, the State contended that (1) Taylor's better-
ments petition was not filed in timely fashion, and (2) in any event, the betterments claim must fail
because Taylor had not been holding under color of title when he made the alleged improvements.
Taylor, 322 N.C. at 434, 368 S.E.2d at 602.
23. The trial court also dismissed the State's contention that the betterments claim was not
timely filed. Id.
24. The trial court dismissed the betterments claim on the ground that the deed from Branden-
burg Land Company to Taylor did not constitute color of title as a matter of law. Id. at 435, 368
S.E.2d at 602.
25. State v. Taylor, 85 N.C. App. 549, 557, 355 S.E.2d 169, 174 (1987), rev'd, 322 N.C. 433,
368 S.E.2d 601 (1988). In dissent, Judge Eagles argued, "[t]he majority has broadened the scope of
the waiver of sovereign immunity.., so as to permit a betterments action against the State.... [I]n
an effort to avoid an inequity, [the majority] has interpreted the waiver statute too broadly.... ." Id.
(Eagles, J., dissenting).
26. On July 27, 1987, the supreme court also granted a State petition for discretionary review
on the issues of untimely filing and color of title. Taylor, 322 N.C. at 435, 368 S.E.2d at 602. These
issues were not addressed by the supreme court in Taylor "[i]n view of... [the] disposition of this
case on the issue of the State's sovereign immunity." Id. at 437, 368 S.E.2d at 604.
27. Id. at 435, 368 S.E.2d at 602 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Turner, 275 N.C. 493, 498, 168
S.E.2d 385, 389 (1969)).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-10.1 reads, in relevant part:
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Challenging the State's immunity defense, Taylor relied on the well-estab-
lished North Carolina rule that "[a]n action for betterments is a defensive right
and not an independent cause of action."' 29 Because the claim can arise only by
virtue of a claim of title, he argued, the betterments claim falls within the ambit
of section 41-10.1, and the state may not assert its sovereign immunity as a
defense.
Although the court of appeals accepted Taylor's argument, 30 the supreme
court squarely rejected his contentions. Citing section 1-340, the supreme court
held that a claim for betterments is "a claim demanding payment for permanent
improvements to the land."'' a The majority reasoned that North Carolina courts
must construe strictly statutes waiving sovereign immunity. 32 Because Taylor's
betterments claim simply was not a "claim of title to land," the majority held
that the waiver of immunity set forth in section 41-10.1 was inapplicable to Tay-
lor's claim.33
The supreme court further removed Taylor's claim for betterments from
the parameters of section 41-10.1 by observing that title to the land was settled
in the State at trial in 1981. Because the court of appeals had affirmed the deci-
sion of the trial court and the supreme court had denied Taylor's petitions for
discretionary review and reconsideration in 1984, Taylor had "exhausted his
right of appeal on the issue of title."3 4 Title had properly vested in the State
and, accordingly, the instant proceeding was not a section 41-10.1 case in which
"'the State ... assert[ed] a claim of title to land.' -35 On these grounds the
supreme court concluded that the claim at issue was "solely one for better-
ments"3 6 and "[tihere is no waiver of the State's sovereign immunity in [the
Whenever the State of North Carolina or any agency or department thereof asserts a
claim of title to land which has not been taken by condemnation and any individual...
likewise asserts a claim of title to the said land, such individual ... may bring an action...
against the State ... for the purpose of determining such adverse claims.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-10.1 (1984).
29. State v. Taylor, 85 N.C. App. 549, 552, 355 S.E.2d 169, 172 (1987), rev'd, 322 N.C. 433,
368 S.E.2d 601 (1988). The action for betterments accrues only when someone with superior title
seeks the aid of the court to enforce his right of possession. See Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266
N.C. 467, 471, 146 S.E.2d 434, 437 (1966); Board of Comm'rs v. Bumpass, 237 N.C. 143, 146-47, 74
S.E.2d 436, 439 (1953).
30. Taylor, 85 N.C. App. at 552, 355 S.E.2d at 172. The court of appeals observed that, in the
original action brought by the State, Taylor's assertion that he owned the land was clearly a claim of
title. Id. Finding that Taylor's defensive betterments claim was necessarily part of his original claim
of title, the court of appeals held that the betterments claim was not barred by sovereign immunity
by virtue of the express waiver granted in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-10.1 for suits involving claims of
title to land. Id.
31. Taylor, 322 N.C. at 435, 368 S.E.2d at 602.
32. Id. at 437, 368 S.E.2d at 604 (citing Guthrie v. State Ports Auth., 307 N.C. 522, 299 S.E.2d
618 (1983) (court strictly construed power of North Carolina State Ports Authority "to sue and be
sued," granted in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-454(I) (1987))). See infra notes 73-74 for a discussion of
Guthrie. See also Mattox v. State, 21 N.C. App. 677, 679, 205 S.E.2d 364, 365 (1974) (construing
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-10.1, court of appeals held "[t]he right to sue the State is a conditional right,
and the statutory provisions must be strictly followed").
33. Taylor, 322 N.C. at 435, 368 S.E.2d at 602.
34. Id. at 435, 368 S.E.2d at 603.
35. Id. at 436, 368 S.E.2d at 603 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-10.1). See supra note 28 for
the relevant text of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-10.1.
36. Taylor, 322 N.C. at 436, 368 S.E.2d at 603.
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betterments statute,] N.C.G.S. § 1-340."37
In ardent dissent, Chief Justice Exum, joined by Justice Webb, argued that
because the doctrine of sovereign immunity derives from the common law, "it is
this Court's province to say how it will be applied or whether it will be applied at
all."' 38 Urging affirmation of the decision of the court of appeals, Chief Justice
Exum insisted that Taylor's betterments claim against the State was sustainable
on "at least three legal theories." 39 First, he argued, a betterments claim is not
properly a claim against the state barred by sovereign immunity.40 Second,
when the state initiates an action for title to realty, it impliedly waives its immu-
nity to suit for betterments put on that realty.4' Third, the Chief Justice rea-
soned, section 41-10.1 should be interpreted, as the court of appeals had
interpreted it, to constitute an express waiver of the state's sovereign immunity
defense to a betterments claim in an action for title brought by the state.42
Moreover, Chief Justice Exum argued that the betterments doctrine is rooted in
equity, and that the state ought not be relieved of its equitable obligation to pay
for permanent improvements to land it receives by virtue of a successful claim of
title.43 "To apply sovereign immunity to relieve the state from this kind of obli-
gation skirts dangerously close to depriving a citizen of property without due
process of law. The state takes but it does not pay."'44
From an historical perspective, the Taylor decision satisfies a not-so-
voracious void in North Carolina case law. When North Carolina courts have
considered statutory betterments claims, they have cited the defensive nature of
the claim to distinguish it, and its common-law predecessor "improvements,"
from the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment.45 The supreme court had not
addressed the question whether the state, having asserted superior title to land,
was shielded by its sovereign immunity from a citizen's claim for betterments. It
is in this respect that the issue facing the Taylor court was unique.
It is essential to review the way in which the North Carolina courts have
treated the doctrines of betterments and sovereign immunity to appreciate the
way the court responded to the conflict between the doctrines that Taylor
presented. The Note proceeds by discussing the betterments doctrine.
37. Id. at 437, 368 S.E.2d at 603.
38. Id. at 439, 368 S.E.2d at 604 (Exum, C.J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303,
222 S.E.2d 412 (1976)). See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of Smith.
39. Id. at 439, 368 S.E.2d at 604 (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
40. Id. 368 S.E.2d at 604-05 (Exum, C.J., dissenting). According to Chief Justice Exum, en-
forcement of a betterments claim against the state does not require the state to expend public funds
unilaterally:
it means, rather, that the State must pay only for what, at its own instance, it demands and
receives. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a shield against payments of the former
kind, not a sword to cut off a citizen's right to be paid for what the State takes.
Id. at 439, 368 S.E.2d at 605 (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
41. Id. (Exum, C.J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976)).
See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of Smith.
42. Id. at 440, 368 S.E.2d at 605 (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 438-39, 368 S.E.2d at 604 (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 439, 368 S.E.2d at 604 (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
45. See cases cited supra notes 7-8.
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At common law, one who establishes superior title to land is entitled to
possession of the land, but a court will not issue a writ of ouster until a judgment
on a claim for betterments has been satisfied. 46 In Rumbough v. Young 47 the
North Carolina Supreme Court explained that "[t]his was done, not upon any
principle of contract or damages for breach of the same, but to . . . enforce
equity and good conscience."' 48 North Carolina has adopted by statute this
common-law protection for the person who makes permanent improvements on
land believing that he has good title.4 9 The right to betterments is based on the
"obvious principle of justice" that the owner of land only has fair claim to the
land itself, plus damages. 50
North Carolina courts have recognized the statutory betterments claim as a
legislative undertaking to "declare and establish the equities" between the par-
ties to a dispute for title to land.51 The statute has been interpreted to impose a
burden on the claimant to establish certain elements: (1) that he made perma-
nent improvements to the property; (2) that he made the improvements with a
bona fide belief that he had good title to the property; and (3) that he had rea-
sonable grounds for his belief.
5 2
If a claimant establishes these elements, section 1-340 provides for the
claimant to recover the value of improvements he has made on another's land.
The statute does not, however, create an independent cause of action.53 The
North Carolina courts have never departed from the position that the right is
purely defensive, accruing only when the true owner of land uses the court to
enforce his right of possession. 54 In Rhyne v. Sheppard5 5 the supreme court
stated that although no independent action for improvements could be main-
tained at common law, a plaintiff could pursue a remedy in equity. "Plaintiff is
not confined to a common law action for improvements, if indeed such right
may be enforced by independent action. He may resort to the equitable doctrine
of unjust enrichment frequently enforced under the doctrine of estoppel. ' '5 6
46. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Bumpass, 237 N.C. 143, 145-46, 74 S.E.2d 436, 439 (1953);
Bond v. Wilson, 129 N.C. 325, 332, 40 S.E. 179, 182 (1901); Albea v. Griffin, 22 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.
Eq.) 9, 10 (1838) (per curiam).
47. 119 N.C. 567, 26 S.E. 143 (1896).
48. Id. at 569, 26 S.E. at 144. The court in Rumbough was explaining the decision in Baker v.
Carson, 21 N.C. 381 (1836), in which the supreme court refused to issue a writ of ouster until the
wrongful possessor was paid for his improvements.
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-340 (1983). See supra note 6 for the relevant text of § 1-340.
50. Pritchard v. Williams, 176 N.C. 108, 109, 96 S.E. 733, 733 (1918).
51. Id. at 110, 96 S.E. at 733.
52. See, e.g., Pamlico County. v. Davis, 249 N.C. 648, 651, 107 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1959); Rogers
v. Timberlake, 223 N.C. 59, 61, 25 S.E.2d 167, 168 (1943); Pritchard, 176 N.C. at 109, 96 S.E. at
733.
53. Board of Comm'rs v. Bumpass, 237 N.C. 143, 146-47, 74 S.E.2d 436, 439 (1953).
54. Id.; see, e.g., Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266 N.C. 467, 471, 146 S.E.2d 434, 437 (1966);
Rhyne v. Sheppard, 224 N.C. 734, 736, 32 S.E.2d 316, 317 (1944); Clontz v. Clontz, 44 N.C. App.
573, 575, 261 S.E.2d 695, 697, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 195, 269 S.E.2d 622 (1980).
55. 224 N.C. 734, 32 S.E.2d 316 (1944). Plaintiff in Rhyne, believing that he was on his own
property, built a house on land owned by defendant. Defendant made no objection to plaintiff's
construction and four-year occupation of the house. Plaintiff's claim for improvements was defeated
because the claim failed to allege color of title. Id. at 735-36, 32 S.E.2d at 316-17.
56. Id. (citation omitted).
1989] 1439
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The equitable root of the improvements right is of particular significance in
the context of the Taylor decision, which did not refer even in passing to the
equities of the case. 57 In prior cases, the supreme court has observed that the
claim against land for improvements or betterments derives from equitable prin-
ciples.58 If a claimant, acting under an honest but mistaken belief that he owned
land, made valuable improvements to it, the true owner should not take the
improvements without paying for them.5 9 This right to compensation "may
now be considered as an established principle of equity." 60 Prior to Taylor the
supreme court's construction of section 1-340, making relief available only to
one who acted in good faith6 1 and under color of title62 he reasonably believed
to be good,6 3 clearly evidenced an intention to adhere to the equitable principles
from which the betterments claim derived.
The decision in Taylor did not turn on the supreme court's determination
whether Taylor's complaint satisfied the statutory elements of a betterments
claim. Rather, the court questioned whether Taylor's claim was nullified by the
State's immunity from suit. Invariably, the supreme court has evaluated the
legitimacy of claims against the state on the basis of some formulation of the
tenet expressed in Great American Insurance Co. v. Gold 4 that "'[i]t is axio-
matic that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts or in any other without
its consent and permission.' "65 This principle of sovereign immunity derives
from feudal England, when the sovereign monarchy could not be held liable to
its subjects.66 Originally, the doctrine was a quasi-religious justification for the
monarchy's self-exemption from the legal process, based on the tenet that "the
king could do no wrong." 67
The doctrine carried with it certain practical ramifications that have been
accepted outside the monarchical context as essential to effective governance. 68
57. Chief Justice Exum's dissenting opinion relied heavily on considerations of equity. Taylor,
322 N.C. at 438, 368 S.E.2d at 604 (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
58. Batts v. Gaylord, 253 N.C. 181, 184, 116 S.E.2d 424, 426-27 (1960); Board of Comm'rs v.
Bumpass, 237 N.C. 143, 145-46, 74 S.E.2d 436, 438-39 (1953).
59. Pritchard v. Williams, 176 N.C. 108, 109-10, 96 S.E. 733, 733 (1918).
60. Wharton v. Moore, 84 N.C. 479, 482 (1881).
61. Eg., Rogers v. Timberlake, 223 N.C. 59, 61, 25 S.E.2d 167, 168 (1943); Pritchard, 176 N.C.
at 109, 96 S.E. at 733.
62. The supreme court's concern with equitable dispositions is reflected in its liberal construc-
tion of what constitutes color of title. In Pamlico County v. Davis, the court accepted an unenforce-
able contract to convey real property as sufficient support for a claim for betterments. 249 N.C. 648,
652, 107 S.E.2d 306, 309-10 (1959). In Albea v. Griffin, the court allowed recovery of the value of
improvements made under a parole contract to purchase land despite enforceability problems posed
by the statute of frauds. 22 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 9, 10 (1838).
63. E.g., Rogers, 223 N.C. at 61, 25 S.E.2d at 168; Pritchard, 176 N.C. at 109, 96 S.E. at 733.
64. 254 N.C. 168, 118 S.E.2d 792 (1961).
65. Id. at 172, 118 S.E.2d at 795 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Powell, 217 N.C. 495, 499, 8
S.E.2d 619, 621 (1940)).
66. Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 592, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1971).
67. Id.; 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Territories, and Dependencies § 99 (1974).
68. See 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Territories, and Dependencies § 99 (1974). The immunity is no
longer inherent in a divine right of kings, but generally is viewed as a rule of social policy "pro-
tect[ing] the state from burdensome interference with the performance of its governmental functions
and preserv[ing] its control over state funds, property, and instrumentalities." Id. If the state were
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It is well-settled that the State of North Carolina is immune from suit unless and
until it expressly consents to be sued. 69 It is also well-settled that it is the role of
the North Carolina General Assembly to address questions of when and under
what circumstances the state may be sued. 70 The standards of construction that
the court has employed to interpret statutory waivers, however, have not been
consistent. 71 As a consequence, there is no uncontradicted answer in North
Carolina case law to the question of what constitutes a statutory waiver of im-
munity. The general rule is that statutory waivers of sovereign immunity being
"in derogation of the common law are... construed strictly."'72 The Taylor
court, citing only the language of Guthrie v. State Ports Authority,73 concluded,
without discussion of alternative rules of construction, that it "must" strictly
construe the waiver statute under which Taylor sought to assert his betterments
claim. 74 In concluding it had a mandate to construe statutory waivers strictly,
the Taylor court neither acknowledged nor discounted a thirty-five-year line of
cases which observes that, notwithstanding the court's historically strict adher-
ence to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, courts need not construe waiver
statutes strictly in those instances in which the legislature has waived the state's
immunity. 75
The North Carolina Supreme Court expressly adopted this idea of permit-
ting courts to exercise a degree of discretion when interpreting the breadth of
statutory waivers of immunity in the 1953 case of Lyon & Sons v. State Board of
"subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen ... [it would be] controlled in the use and disposi-
tion of the means required for the proper administration of the government." Id.
69. See, e.g., Guthrie v. State Ports Auth., 307 N.C. 522, 534, 299 S.E.2d 618, 625 (1983);
Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 309, 222 S.E.2d 412, 417 (1976); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gold, 254 N.C.
168, 172, 118 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1961); Schloss v. State Highway Comm'n, 230 N.C. 489, 491, 53
S.E.2d 517, 518 (1949).
70. Great Am. Ins. Co., 254 N.C. at 173, 118 S.E.2d at 795; see Guthrie, 307 N.C. at 535, 299
S.E.2d at 625; Lyon & Sons v. State Bd. of Educ., 238 N.C. 24, 26-28, 76 S.E.2d 553, 555-56 (1953);
Mattox v. State, 21 N.C. App. 677, 678-79, 205 S.E.2d 364, 365 (1974).
71. As early as 1955 the North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged the lack of agreement
among courts in other states. Floyd v. State Highway Comm'n, 241 N.C. 461, 464, 85 S.E.2d 703,
705 (1955).
72. Wilmington Shipyard, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 6 N.C. App. 649, 651, 171 S.E.2d
222, 224 (1969), cert. denied, 276 N.C. 327 (1970); see, e.g., Guthrie, 307 N.C. at 537-38, 299 S.E.2d
at 627; Floyd, 241 N.C. at 464, 85 S.E.2d at 705; 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Territories, and Dependen-
cies § 121 (1974).
73. 307 N.C. 522, 299 S.E.2d 618 (1983). The Guthrie court, in a suit for injuries plaintiff
sustained while operating a forklift in a warehouse supervised by the State Ports Authority, found no
implicit waiver of sovereign immunity with regard to the State Ports Authority; however, it did find
that the explicit limited waiver of immunity for negligent acts of state employees as set forth in the
State Tort Claims Act applied to the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 538, 299 S.E.2d at 627. Analogously,
Taylor sought to assert a N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-340 claim for betterments against the state under the
waiver of immunity granted in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-10.1, which waives immunity in claims of title
to land. See supra note 6 for the text of § 1-340. See supra note 28 for the text of § 41-10.1.
74. State v. Taylor, 322 N.C. 433, 437, 368 S.E.2d 601, 604 (1988). In Guthrie the supreme
court strictly construed N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-454(1), which vests the North Carolina Ports Au-
thority with the authority to "sue or be sued," reasoning that "[w]aiver of sovereign immunity may
not be lightly inferred." Guthrie, 307 N.C. at 537-38, 299 S.E.2d at 627.
75. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 309-21, 222 S.E.2d 412, 417-24 (1976); Lyon & Sons
v. State Bd. of Educ., 238 N.C. 24, 27-28, 76 S.E.2d 553, 555-56 (1953); Wilmington Shipyard v.
State Highway Comm'n, 6 N.C. App. 649, 651-55, 171 S.E.2d 222, 224-27 (1969), cert. denied, 276
N.C. 327 (1970).
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Education.76 Lyon' & Sons was a case of first impression in North Carolina and
presented the supreme court with the question of the State's immunity under the
State Tort Claims Act.77 Acknowledging that the body of case law supporting
strict construction was overwhelming, the Lyon & Sons court nevertheless ob-
served that "the current trend of legislative policy and of judicial thought is
toward the abandonment of the monarchistic doctrine of governmental immu-
nity."' 78 This trend is especially appropriate when "[strict] interpretation would
lead... to illogical result[s]."'79 Adopting the language of Justice Cardozo in a
case construing a New York waiver statute,80 the supreme court in Lyon & Sons
based its retreat from traditional construction on the notion that " '[t]he exemp-
tion of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough, where consent has
been withheld. [The court is] ... not to add to its rigor by refinement of con-
struction where consent has been announced.' "81 The North Carolina Court of
Appeals also invoked this passage from Justice Cardozo in Wilmington Shipyard
v. State Highway Commission.82 There the court of appeals rejected outright the
rule of strict construction of statutory waivers of immunity, remarking that the
rule is of "questionable origins... [and is] quoted without examination in cases
where the strictest possible construction [is] not required to reach the result."8
3
The North Carolina Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to express its view
on this rule when it refused to grant certiorari.
8 4
Earlier supreme court decisions recognized the necessity of a more flexible
approach to construction of statutory changes to common-law rules governing
liability. In Essick v. City of Lexington 8 5 the supreme court spoke of the Work-
ers' Compensation Act8 6 as a "retreat from the outmoded methods of the com-
mon law to a more modern concept,"'8 7 and held that "break[s] with the past
must necessarily be viewed with liberality in order to accomplish [their] pur-
76. 238 N.C. 24, 76 S.E.2d 553 (1953). There were earlier cases suggestive of this more liberal
bent in statutory construction. See, e.g., Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 208, 60 S.E.2d
106, 112 (1950). For a discussion of Essick, see infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
77. Lyon & Sons, 238 N.C. at 26, 76 S.E.2d at 554. The State Tort Claims Act is codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to -300.1 (1987).
78. Lyon & Sons, 238 N.C. at 27, 76 S.E.2d at 555. See also 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Territories,
and Dependencies § 101 (1974) (it has been said that the doctrine is in disfavor, and "today courts
are disposed to hear an action against the state unless good reason stands in the way").
79. Lyon & Sons, 238 N.C. at 33, 76 S.E.2d at 560.
80. Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 153 N.E. 28 (1926) (Cardozo, J.)
(suit involving lien on money state owed to contractors, and state had waived immunity to suits
involving such liens).
81. Lyon & Sons, 238 N.C. at 27, 76 S.E.2d at 555 (quoting Anderson, 243 N.Y. at 147, 153
N.E. at 29-30, quoted with approval in United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383
(1949)).
82. 6 N.C. App. 649, 653-54, 171 S.E.2d 222, 225 (1969), cert. denied, 276 N.C. 327 (1970).
83. Id. at 653, 171 S.E.2d at 225.
84. Wilmington Shipyard v. State Highway Comm'n, 276 N.C. 327 (1970) (denying certiorari).
85. 232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950). The Essick controversy concerned a state employee
killed on the job and the apparent inability to reconcile provisions of the Workers' Compensation
Act with the common law, which the Act substantially amended.
86. When Essick was decided, the Workers' Compensation Act, now codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97 (1985), was titled the Workmen's Compensation Act.
87. Essick, 232 N.C. at 208, 60 S.E.2d at 112.
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poses." 88 The North Carolina Supreme Court in Essick emphatically asserted
that the Workers' Compensation Act is "superior to the common law in those
respects in which [it] ... amend[s] or abrogate[s] it."8 9
Liberal construction was again the mode of statutory interpretation em-
ployed by the supreme court in the 1976 case of Smith v. State.90 In Smith the
supreme court relied on the Lyon & Sons decision as its starting point, noting
with approval the "current trend" away from strict sovereign immunity.9 1 The
Smith court proffered an exhaustive treatise on legislative and judicial erosion of
the sovereign immunity doctrine in other states and, finding itself "moved by the
foregoing considerations," held that "whenever the State of North Carolina...
enters into a valid contract, the State implicitly consents to be sued for damages
.. in the event it breaches the contract." 92 Acknowledging that there was sig-
nificant historical authority to the contrary, the supreme court in Smith held
that in causes of action on contract, "the doctrine of sovereign immunity will
not be a defense to the State. The State will occupy the same position as any
other litigant."'93
It was this line of decisions on which the court of appeals relied in Taylor to
apply a liberal construction of North Carolina General Statutes section 41-10.1
and hold that the State, having successfully sued in ejectment a citizen holding.
land under color of title, could not assert its sovereign immunity as an absolute
defense to the citizen's claim for betterments. 94 The court of appeals reasoned
that because the State had expressly waived its immunity in suits involving
claims of title to land, and because the claim for betterments can only arise
defensively to a claim of title to land, the claim for betterments was a component
of Taylor's claim of fee simple title and should be interpreted as a "claim of title
to land" as that term is used in the waiver statute, section 41-10.1. 95
The supreme court in Taylor flatly rejected this reasoning. The court relied
instead on an absolute interpretation of the state's immunity from suit-an in-
terpretation rooted in the ancient common law. Without denying the existence
or refuting the reasoning of recent case law to the contrary, the Taylor court
maintained that the state is immune from suit absolutely and unqualifiedly, ab-
sent express waiver. In determining what constitutes an express waiver of im-
munity, the court looked to a much criticized and largely abandoned general
rule of construction and fashioned from it an absolute mandate that courts
strictly construe waiver statutes. Because the statute permitting action against
the state in suits involving claims of title to land does not refer specifically to
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976). In Smith the State asserted its sovereign immunity as
a defense to a doctor's suit for wrongful discharge from a state-owned medical facility. The defend-
ants were the State and state officials acting within the scope of their official duties.
91. Id. at 311, 222 S.E.2d at 418.
92. Id. at 320, 222 S.E.2d at 423-24.
93. Id. at 320, 222 S.E.2d at 424.
94. State v. Taylor, 85 N.C. App. 549, 552, 355 S.E.2d 169, 172 (1987), rev'd, 322 N.C. 433,
368 S.E.2d 601 (1988).
95. Id.
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"betterments," the court held that the state is "entitled to the full protection of
its sovereign immunity."'96
By its language, the waiver statute does not refer specifically to any "claim
of title to land."' 97 Deferring to what it perceived to be overriding principles of
common law, the supreme court elected to give itself no discretion in defining a
"claim of title" under the statute.
The Workers' Compensation Act and the Tort Claims Act are purely statu-
tory creatures. They can subject the state to suit in derogation of the common-
law doctrine of sovereign immunity. Nevertheless, the supreme court has held
unequivocally that "[tihere is no presumption of superiority in the common
law," s9 8 and expressly recognizing the trend away from the 'doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the court has construed liberally these statutory waivers of immunity
in order that the statutes accomplish their purposes. In Smith the supreme
court found an implied waiver of immunity in actions on breach of contract in
the absence of any statute.99 The betterments right, though codified in the
North Carolina General Statutes, is an equitable doctrine, derived from consid-
erations of conscience and fairness. A more compelling argument can be made
for liberal construction of the statute protecting this equitable interest than for
the aforementioned statutorily created claims. The Worker's Compensation Act
and the Tort Claims Act are drafted with particularity and their provisions have
been subject to extensive litigation and commentary. Nonetheless, in State v.
Taylor the supreme court blindly adhered to the old general rule of strict con-
struction of waivers of governmental immunity-explaining only that it "must."
That the supreme court can strictly interpret waiver statutes is beyond
doubt. That it must is an argument that fails to pass muster upon examination
of relevant case law. The assertion that strict reading of section 41-10.1 is man-
dated by prior decisions conveniently masks the Taylor court's inexplicable fail-
ure to marshal the equities of the case. Permitting Taylor to recover the fair
value of permanent improvements he mistakenly made to the state's land would
not subject the state to a burdensome flood of litigation. Consider by compari-
son the liability the state incurs through suits brought by injured employees, on
contracts, and in tort. Moreover, a claimant seeking to recover for betterments
need not merely claim that he has placed improvements on land owned by an-
other, but must also establish that he did so in good faith and under color of title
he reasonably believed to be good.
Mr. Taylor deserved compensation for the improvements he made upon the
state's land. The North Carolina Supreme Court had available the tools with
which to render a sound and equitable decision in State v. Taylor. It was fully
within the power of the court to construe Mr. Taylor's betterments claim as a
96. Taylor, 322 N.C. at 437, 368 S.E.2d at 604. But see Shingleton v. State, 260 N.C. 451, 458-
59, 133 S.E.2d 183, 188-89 (1963) ("claim of title" under § 41-10.1 held to encompass actions for
easements across state property).
97. See supra note 28 for the relevant text of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-10.1.
98. Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 208, 60 S.E.2d 106, 112 (1950).
99. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 320, 222 S.E.2d 412, 423-24 (1976).
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"claim of title to land." Instead, the court put aside its innovative modem tools
of construction and dusted off the ancient tools of blind convention.
GEORGE MONTGOMERY CLELAND, IV
